In the 2010s, low fertility became an integral part of Japan’s overall public policy direction. Low fertility policies were incorporated into Japan’s macroeconomic policy, national land planning and regional and local development.
Despite these continuous and comprehensive efforts to increase the fertility rate, Japan’s policies have fallen short of achieving increases in fertility that would mitigate the social and economic effects of population decline and ageing.
DIFFICULT TO REVERSE FALLING FERTILITY RATES
Still, Japan’s policies have halted a further slide in the fertility rate. Unlike other East Asian economies such as South Korea and Taiwan, whose TFR in 2021 dwindled to 0.81 and 1.07, respectively, Japan’s rate remained at 1.30.
Japan’s experience shows how difficult it is to restore fertility to the replacement level, especially when a country has a sizable population and a persistently low birth rate.
It also seems unrealistic to counter Japan’s rapid population decline through an immediate and drastic increase in international migration by liberalising the country’s immigration policies. The number of deaths in Japan is expected to rise in the next few decades owing to increases in the elderly population.
That means the country has no choice but to strengthen efforts to sustain and, hopefully, boost fertility. To do this, Tokyo should help women and couples balance their work and family roles to lighten the heavy social and economic costs associated with population decline.
Japan’s labour market needs to become more family-friendly, while gender roles at home must become less traditional. Even if policy efforts to make the workplace more family-friendly and the home more gender-equal fail to raise fertility and slow population decline, they will likely improve the well-being of Japanese families by improving the quality of family life.
Noriko Tsuya is Distinguished Professor at Keio University. This commentary first appeared on East Asia Forum.
