THERE IS NO DEAL WITHOUT US CONCESSIONS
The US and North Korea are politically and strategically very far apart. Their differences cannot be resolved by a single, dramatic hammer-stroke, like a summit among “friends” as Mr Trump insists he and Mr Kim are.
If Mr Trump is serious about reaching an agreement, he needs to make a detailed offer to Mr Kim. In fact, he probably needs to offer several different, detailed offers, so that there is room for him and Mr Kim to make swaps and trades when they disagree. These offers also need to have buy-in from relevant parties in Washington – the Defense Department, State Department, Congress, the North Korea-watching think-tank community – and South Korea.
Without support from important constituencies in the US and South Korea, any deal Mr Trump makes risks bureaucratic resistance. This is what happened when then president Bill Clinton struck a deal with North Korea in the 1990s without Congressional Republican support.
Next, Mr Trump’s offers must include concessions from the US. North Korea will not just denuclearise because of US threats, or vague offers of money or future concessions. Mr Trump has already tried that, unsuccessfully.
This will be hard. No one wants to make concessions to Pyongyang, particularly given how awful the regime is. But without some form of compromise, North Korea will not negotiate. We learnt that between 2017 and 2019.
US concessions might include a lifting of United Nations sanctions, financial aid, some level of diplomatic recognition, a reconfiguration of US forces on the Korean Peninsula, and so on. These US concessions would be traded for North Korean counter-concessions. Pyongyang will not completely denuclearise, so demanding that – as Mr Trump did in Hanoi – will end the negotiations.
